加密飛行 Vol.7a | 黃孫權專訪：加密沒有思想；朋友們啊，我們還在被殖民

借第九屆網絡社會年會在泰國舉辦之際，我們與主辦者中國美術學院，網絡社會研究所所長黃孫權教授在曼谷進行了對談。網絡社會研究所（以下簡稱網研所）長期關注網絡通訊技術對社會文化的影響。從 2016 年開始，網絡社會年會每年都會從不同角度與主題切入技術發展與社會變革的關係，觀察網絡對藝術、社會思潮、全球行動的塑造。年會主題緊跟技術變化與社會現實，過往的參與者不乏包括 Vitalik 在內的諸多加密技術實踐者與研究者。

網研所近年的許多研究與實踐，也圍繞着加密技術展開。如結合鄉建與區塊鏈技術，發行社交通證「 Coop」等。在藝術家與教授的身份之外，黃孫權也是華語圈的互聯網先鋒，曾推進開源軟件在亞洲的漢化，建立亞洲早期的獨立網絡媒體和博客社群。他的網絡參與始終與行動主義緊密相連，也因此構成他自己的技術哲學觀——技術應當被社會地改良。

基於對加密世界大量的見證與參與，黃孫權亦有許多體悟與反思。這些思考往往回到他親歷的早期網絡革命，合作社運動和社會運動的歷史當中。

技術文化史回顧

Libertarian與加密技術意識形態

一些事件對後續的影響關係很清楚，但有些並不是。比如，我們知道Libertarian後來深入地滲透到加密意識形態中，但這個過程中到底是什麼關鍵因素導致了這樣的滲透結果呢？

黃孫權：關於這項社會運動的思潮脈絡變化是個非常重要的問題，我現在也沒什麼確切的答案，但對這個脈絡的思考放在整個西方視角就會比較好理解。

簡單地概括，Libertarian和加密技術之間的互動關係其實很清楚。加密朋克本身自己並沒有意識形態，它沒有自己真正的思想，因此被Libertarian的意識形態佔領了。

這種佔領關係最早可以溯源到冷戰時期，在當時，冷戰，自由主義，密碼學，這三者是共鬥關係。冷戰時，蘇聯的衛星上天讓美國人非常恐慌，害怕自己落後了。對他們來說，技術一定是要迎頭趕上的，只有這樣才能夠保證美國人的自由。這種對『自由』的意識是當時Libertarian與美國國防部一致的共識：對Libertarian來說，獨立自主和擁有先進的技術是個人自由的關鍵基礎；對美國國防部來說，這同樣代表着國家意識形態的獨立自由。後來所有互聯網跟加密貨幣在最開始的宣言也都是保護自由，保衛所謂美國式的自由——都來自於他們這一根深蒂固的潛意識。

除了技術層面有一致的潛意識追求， 當時Libertarian所追求的自由狀態並不絕對與美國國家權力起衝突。那些搞公社文化的人非常崇尚自由，這種自由是某一種特定的個人主義式的自由。對Libertarian來說，我現在有錢有技術，我可以隨時和我朋友聊天，跟我這一群人溝通，我可以擺脫對國家的依賴。這種個人主義式的自由其實不是一個對抗國家的概念，而是一個極大化個體自由的概念。它不一定反國家,反美國,在那個時期它和美國國防部其實是共享一個意識形態。

在冷戰背景下，密碼學與早期的信息技術在當時便成為了一項被Libertarian與政府兩者共同寄予厚望的、能夠支持美國與個人自由的工具。於是，在當時，美國國防部有 80%的研發資金都拿給三所冷戰大學 MIT， Berkely 和 Standford，去做早期的相關技術研發。 MIT 設計的 PTP-1 成為後面一系列計算機研發的基礎，當時每一個最新的電腦都被用在軍種，像是海軍、陸軍和空軍。有一本書叫創造冷戰大學（ Creating the Cold War University），講的就是這件事。比冷戰大學更早的例子是貝爾實驗室，也是輔助政府進行研發，不過貝爾實驗室開發的東西更加實用主義，有點像現在的大深圳*。

回到自由主義，密碼學，冷戰這三者的共鬥關係，自由主義變成主導的那個意識形態，國防部想的是我要保持美國的自由，朋克想的是我要保持個人的自由，Libertarian（自由意志主義）想要的是自由意識（我的意志，我的財產我的錢不要受人控制）。所以這三個你可以想象他們為什麼可以合流。

因為接收了自由主義的意識形態，被Libertarian take over 了，整個加密朋克就是自由意識論的。我不大能說它是 liberal 或 neo-liberal 的，但它一定是自由意志論的。現在加密朋克基於密碼學去倡導保護個人隱私，當成一種主流和主要目標，但這個目標並不一定是所有人的意志，而是是自由意志主義的。確實，密碼學最能夠保證的就是你的 privacy，但實際上隱私對窮人不重要，隱私是對富人很重要，對公司重要。作為窮人，我已經一無所有了，還有什麼重要的？所以密碼學的那個 privacy 看似是在保障所有人，運用好的時候保護社會整體，但現實更多時候是在幫富人做財產轉移。

有技術但不知道要幹嗎，然後被來自其他地方的意識形態佔領，基本上就是整個科技界在思想和意志上長期以來的常態。中國現在這麼強大，但如果你問你的 vision 是什麼，你要出來做什麼，其實說不太出來。或許你會說至少我們實現自由了吧，但這個自由是財務的自由，不是精神上的，我聽到最多的，就是一種務實的現實主義論調。

因此，我從舊金山的訪談找到的那一條線索，就是 Libertarian 和技術進步論是一種共構。背後是冷戰和國防部大學所有的研發實驗室，最後雜糅出來的技術把全世界所有的東西相互關聯，把這個社會所有的生活關係都變成一種 Data，然後就開始採礦。

現在中國也有很好的技術，也有很多各種商業的和國際上的力量，那我們的技術要有什麼樣的思想？要推銷哪一種文化？我們這種東西跟美國是一樣還是不一樣？如果中國只是另外一個美國，那我們到底在忙什麼?如果我們最後的路子和美國一樣，那其實我們也不用有那麼多反美的東西。我們華人有沒有特殊的對待技術的方式？

技術哲學觀點：社會運動與技術結合

單一生產率衡量

這套價值觀好像就是我們近代以來對技術的態度，也是潛意識裡對人的態度。

7k：是噢，生產力本身就是一個單一價值的詞，它意味着各種各樣不同類型的、不同地區的生產，都要被統一到一個價值，那就是貨幣的價值，可以這麼認為嗎？

黃孫權：是的。我們把對生產力的評估全部放在市場上評價，因為除了市場化評價以外，你也沒辦法評估我們的生產率有多少，一旦通過市場評價，就一定會有這樣的現象。

自我東方化

現在西方那套發展技術的途徑似乎行不通了，打算把中國特殊文化裡某一種特定文化當作抵抗的武器，這是肯定行不通的，歷史上從來沒有發生過這樣成功的先例。明代是一個最好的證明，日本的明治維新也是。明治維新時期，難道日本就沒有武士道？那為什麼它還是可以這麼厲害？因為它是開放的，接受新的東西，也沒有完全去除掉日本的文化，中國明代也是這樣的。所以，雖然文化確實決定了我們看待技術的態度，但不代表文化會決定技術成不成功。技術成不成功完全是一個 universal 的問題，是個數學問題。

許煜寫的精彩的書，成為西方人非常喜歡讀的東西，因為他覺得中國真的不太一樣了，因為我們認為技術是器，然後我們還有一個『道』。如果藉由這種解釋，大家一起陶醉在東方的技術認知裡，這種看法其實是文化衝突論的變形，是一種東方主義式的哲學化文化的變形。這個東西怎麼可能變成我們的答案？你要想看中國的技術是怎麼進步的，是要看當代國家（ State）的角色怎麼主導技術，怎麼看待發展與進步，這才是關鍵，而非依賴傳統文化的觀點。印度，日本，韓國，臺灣，大陸每個地方有不同多元的文化，那難道它們都因此有不同的技術嗎？

935：能不能這樣來理解，一開始這種技術東西分化論只是想為大家提供另外一個看待技術的視角，讓大家認識到除了西方那套把技術現代化的做事方式，或許我們還有其他的道路可以選擇。本來最理想的狀態是，我們一起把認知打開，看到多種參考案例後，對技術的思路會多些可能性。但現在這種渲染東方態度的做法，把東方文化特殊化了，導致一群人從一種唯一解的主流思想，一股腦又全切換成了另外一種唯一解的主流思想？

黃孫權：是啊，如果都跑去山上練功，就覺得可以解決生活焦慮，這不是自我東方化嗎？

技術價值被社會地運用

臺灣因為有社會力量的參與，技術和社會的磨合結果會跟大陸不太一樣。我們是站在總統府前面喊總統下臺的那一代人，我自己也參加許多的工人運動，社區改造的計劃，所以我們完全知道技術要做什麼。那時候我們會那麼興奮去搞Indymedia或 Blog，是因為我們覺得，以前我們要發文章有多困難，要通過主流媒體才能說話。現在自己每天都可以發，每天都可以寫東西罵一遍。就是因為有這些東西在，所以會使得社會變革變得很不一樣。同樣一個技術，我們可以把這個技術拿過來，變成為草根，為社會說話的技術。

臺灣有這樣一波一波的運動，譬如說性別運動。舉個簡單的例子，我在唸研究生的時候，我們女同學超兇的，只要我們講話犯一點點錯就會被羞辱。在臺大的時候，男生宿舍經常會放 A 片，然後臺大女生也在宿舍做了一個 A 片活動，說為什麼男生可以看片但女生就不行。所以就在宿舍放 A 片，批評 A 片都是為男性服務，沒有為女性服務。她們還搞了一場霸佔男廁的運動，就是讓所有臺大女上去上男孩子的廁所，因為她們覺得，女生使用廁所的時間比較長，但是為什麼空間是一樣大，這不公平。所以她們就鼓勵所有人去霸佔男生廁所。這樣一波一波的運動搞出來，後來臺灣所有的新的公共建築裡的廁所都規定，女生廁所的空間要是男生廁所的兩倍以上。這是運動的成果。

就是這些東西不停地轉，臺灣才能變成那個樣子。所以我關注的是這種社會變革的力量，不是那種形而上的傳統文化，那個離我們有點遠。不過社會變革的力量一定會立足於文化傳統，社會變革一定有自己的文化基調，但不是那些老子莊子道家的東西。

我關注的這種技術現實和文化並沒有離得太遠，只是我不太喜歡那種所有東西都要從道家、墨家開始講起的說法，我覺得這不起作用。我最關心的是社會變革，每個地區的社會變革一定是不一樣的，印度有印度的，日本有日本的，臺灣有臺灣的，大陸有大陸各個地方的，因為南北差異很大。這才是我最最關切的點吧。

再舉一個社會力量改良技術的例子。 Uber 入駐臺灣的時候，臺灣有幾千臺計程車開到到總統府廣前前去抗議 Uber。後來就強迫 Uber 的價錢要和當地過去的市場價格同價，要收稅，所有開車的人都要經過職業培訓——這些都是來自工會的壓力。現在在臺灣，你可以打 Uber,也可以打各種計程車，另外所有的 Uber 僱員也都是享受同樣水平的保障的，所以不用擔心會出現大平臺欺壓的情況；德州的 Green Taxi 存在也是因為工會的力量在對抗 Uber。所以我說沒有經過社會變革的力量，技術是不會變更好的。當技術有社會力量制衡時，它就會變成一個非常「好」的技術，這種社會變革的力量一般都是非常傳統的，工會的，社區的， local 的, 有最低工資的保障基本的職業訓練。沒有這些力量，技術就會是殖民主義的，會來到一個地方然後就殺掉一切。

失去文化背景的技術覺醒

黃孫權：這其實是 Libertarian 的覺醒。

935：我也有類似的感受。 Web3 倡導的東西(至少目前) 並不真正原生自生活中大多數人直接的覺醒，而是有一部分人把他們自己的需求說成了所有人的需求。

黃孫權：是的，其實他們說的東西並不是真的你們這一代人真正所面臨的問題。不過他們出來做一做事情也有好處，因為現在我們的社會力量內陷了。

臺灣的 Open Source 運動、藝立協，還有唐鳳都是在後學運時代出來的東西，韓國第一個公民新聞 OhMyNews 也是和盧武鉉的上臺，韓國的工運傳統有關。所以，你可以看到每個地方衍生出的新的媒介藝術，其實都跟他們當時的社會需要有關。可麻煩的是，到了 2000 年後，所有東西都在臉書和推特這樣的大平臺上面，這個自然規律被洗掉了。臺灣後來的社會運動也不像之前 20 年那麼激烈了。臺灣現在就只有兩個敵人，一個並不是真的但是名義上是敵人——大陸，另外一個是國民黨。社會運動可討論的變革變得非常狹隘，所以這裡面不會有更大的社會力量。因為任何事情只要一談到大陸在，其他的事情馬上就不重要了；對大陸來說也是這樣，任何事情只要一講到美國在，其他事情就都靠後。這使得我們所有內部的力量就好像內陷了，出不去了。從這種程度來說，我覺得 Web3 或 Blockchain，或者說在外面的 Digital nomad 可能會有一些力量。這些人可以出來乾點事情還是有意思的，不要以Libertarian非常個人主義式的方法去幹就好。如果這個東西最終是出去解決自己的財富自由，那就沒有意義了。

當代加州意識形態

重現殖民

黃孫權：你提的那個問題可以這樣來想：美國的東南亞是墨西哥，歐洲的東南亞是西班牙的 Ibiza，現在 Crypto 也是在重現這種路線。美國和中國加密貨幣以及 web3 的東南亞就是清邁，這種路線在歷史上不斷出現，我一點都不意外，這是必然路線。就好像那些 Digital nomad 一樣， 21 世紀的新嬉皮。以前的嬉皮士會做劇場，會做音樂，還有點文化，現在這群 Geek 版的 digital nomad 什麼都不會，特別無聊，這些宅男帶來的東西都非常慘不忍睹。我以前是個 Party goer,參加過許多的 informal party, 每週都去。我聽說那時候的嬉皮也很蠢也很癡迷東方主義，但至少他們的文化熱忱還在。當這些都變成 Geek 來搞的時候，就變得非常無聊。特別是華語社區更無聊，每次所有人過去就只會說牛逼牛逼很棒，甚至都沒有別的詞彙來形容。

虛偽的 Diversity

從比較大的政治結構來說，加州意識形態和Libertarian就是最後讓川普獲勝的最大原因。Libertarian在推廣的過程中，讓貧富差距變大了，但這些人會關心的都是被政治正確要挾的正確類別：種族膚色、性別認同、不同政治傾向。無產階級的人，沒有工作的人，從來不在他們的視野中，於是底層人們越來越鬱悶，沒有任何人幫他們說話。所以這次美國選舉， 60%多的亞裔， 70%多的拉丁裔跟黑人都投川普，這已經不是少數族群和白人的矛盾，是底層與上層的矛盾。

早期非商業版 Indymedia的建設

黃孫權：我是讀建築出身，最早是自己做事務所。後來，臺灣反市政府推土機運動開始的時候，我發起幾百個設計專業者、上千民衆公開反對政府，那時候才認識到學建築根本沒有用，因為建築完全就是為了資本服務的。所以我就把公司關掉，再也不搞建築了，下定決心幹點別的事。我在想用一種方式，建築也好，媒介也好，能夠說一些大家應該關心但可能還不知道的事。

當時我們搞學運的一批人去搞小劇場，搞音樂節，搞女性主義——使得臺灣在 1994 年的時候就有女性影展，女性戲劇節這些東西。但是當時的主流媒體不會報導我們，所以我們就覺得，那不如我們來寫我們自己，我們寫我們自己的故事總可以吧？所以就搞了《破報》，搞了 20 年，臺灣有很多年輕人都是看《破報》長大的。當時崔健出了一張新專輯，連唐鳳也來《破報》匿名寫樂評。

後來接觸到網絡，主要是在 2000 年左右，因為那時候 blog 系統開始進到臺灣了。那時候的開源軟件不兼容雙位元檢索*，這樣會導致我們的網站沒辦法檢索中文。所以我們就整天和他們吵，去跟他們吵要加入雙音節字符的檢索系統。這樣之後， WordPress 和其他幾個流行的開源軟件才開始漢化。

比這個更早的網絡參與，是 1999 年的Indymedia。當時Indymedia在全球有 120 個城市參與，我們在臺北也弄了一箇中心。解決了檢索問題後，我們是漢語界第一個做Indymedia的。在 2000 年左右，在Indymedia上沒有任何審查，可以寫文章、傳圖片、聲音和影像等。Indymedia在西雅圖的總網站有一個 RSS 技術*,可以把全球 120 個分城市的內容都彙集到總網站。所有人都集中在那個上面，力量非常非常得大，在當時Indymedia的影響力可以媲美主流媒介的。像是當時亞馬遜對媒體有一個全球網頁排行，Indymedia的排名非常靠近路透社，法新社和 CNN 這樣大的國際主流大新聞媒體。它的功能很像現在的 Web2,可以讀，寫，上傳。所以，如果真的要講正本清源的話，其實臉書，推特並不是最早的 Web2, Indymedia時期就已經有這些功能了。

人民的媒體失去話語權的開始

黃孫權：這裡面涉及了幾個階段的轉變。最早是所有人都在Indymedia上面寫東西，傳東西。因為不做審查，所有東西都能在上面發表。Indymedia會做一個推薦機制，由一些編輯投票把覺得好的東西往首頁前面推薦。這些編輯其實是一個集體的合作組織，使用者也可以把內容往前往上去推，只是使用者的分值權重會稍微小一些。最後在Indymedia首頁前面的都是編輯覺得很好的或很重要的新聞，但往下滑到很後面也可以看到一些例如類似法西斯右翼的言論——所以當時就有非常民主的推薦機制。

後來時間久後，有些比較有個人影響力和粉絲號召力的寫手，發現與其在Indymedia平臺這邊發，他們自己也可以搭建一個 Blog，在自己的 Blog 寫。這個時候就開始興起一批個人 Blog。這種形式的個人 Blog 某種上程度來說開始失掉了最早大家一起做平臺的那份合力。以前在Indymedia的時候，大家有一種集體抗爭的努力，是所有人集結的發聲；轉到 Blog 寫後，變成了只有作者個人與聽衆的關係。這種感受是不一樣的。

不過這個時候也還不算完全變質。大部分人搭建個人 Blog 還是會依託在幾個主要的服務器上。兩岸三地都有一些帶頭的服務器，例如在大陸是 Blog.cn。這些大服務器們會牽頭組織一些活動，例如當時的第一屆華文 Blog 大賽。那時候方興東整天在我們旁邊跟着幹這幹那，我們當時都沒怎麼注意他，後來才發現他變成「博客之父」。上一屆 MIT Media Lab 的主任也會在圈子裡一起做事，因為當時亞洲都需要解決軟件上使用雙位語言共同的困境，所以亞洲的部落格圈，像是臺灣，香港，大陸，韓國，日本，基本上都混在一起。因為部落格的事情，我們當時在臺灣開會，在香港開會，也在大陸開會。從某種程度上，我覺得 2000 年到 2003 年的這些時間搞不好是兩岸三地最親密的時刻。

所以說在 Blog 時期，個人和組織的交流，組織和組織的交流還是會有一些情分在。真正的轉變在 2003 年之後，一些商業系統開始進入了。像是中國時報有自己的服務器，聯合報有自己的服務器，臺灣的無名小站也有自己的服務器。但因為我們的服務器（ twblog,net）很舊，速度慢，大家就紛紛搬到商業平臺上去。同時，商業平臺的宣傳力度更大，他們很快就變成熱門。最早時候 Blog 還沒有考慮收益的事情，但是 Influencer 的概念在那個時候就有了，有些商業平臺會付費找 Influencer 到他們平臺寫。服務器也需要有錢維持，於是開始出現要考慮收益的事情。

7K：這是不是資本主義收編的開始？因為大家開始想要有收益。

黃孫權: 是的。把服務器搬到商業平臺後，商業公司要考慮服務器變現的問題，整個 Blog 空間內逐漸加入了一些商業考量。比如加了很多廣告——這使得你自己的 Blog 空間不再是你能控制的，廣告是平臺的，你沒法去除掉廣告。

7K：不過好像這種商業化考慮的加入是不是其實也符合常理？畢竟它確實帶來了更大的體量，提供更快的平臺和更好的服務。

轉變過程中為什麼會發生失控？

比如，我知道在上個世紀 90 年代，當商業物聯網還處在早期時，我們曾經就互聯網的盈利模式有過兩種方案:一種是 Micropayment, 另一種就是我們今天最熟悉的廣告模式。 Micropayment 是對你網絡上所有瀏覽過的東西都進行電子貨幣付費，這個電子貨幣就是今天所有加密貨幣的前身，它的好處是平臺端和政府無法將消費記錄與個人信息聯繫起來。不過後來的互聯網選擇了後一種模式，也即插廣告的方式，雖然所有東西免費，但我們好像也逐漸因為這種方式逐漸失去了我們對內容還有對自己隱私的控制權。您覺得今天我們這樣的局面是因為當初的商業模式選擇出了問題嗎？

黃孫權：我覺得這個事情最後的選擇跟我們的媒體慣性有關。比如說我們看電視，我們習慣了看電視不用付任何錢，這就會讓大部分人習慣這種收聽模式。互聯網的開始也跟看電視聽廣播一樣，如果你要一開始就付費，最後可能只會搞得沒有人會用它。並且最早的時候，大家對於網上支付的工具並不熟悉，上手會有門檻。不過，現在很難推翻回去想象如果當時選擇了另外一種歷史途徑，現在會怎麼樣。

935: 如果換一條思路來想這個商業化的問題，可不可以說，其實問題不在於選擇哪種途徑變現，問題可能出在變現這件事情上？

黃孫權：可能是的。創造和做事情的動機變了。 90 年代 Open source 剛開始做的時候完全沒有想變現問題，那時候只想着： TMD 這個世界已經夠糟了，我怎麼讓別人聽到我的聲音？根本沒有人在考慮錢。到 2002 年開始搞各種部落格平臺的時候也還是這樣。臺灣有很多爛東西，香港有很多爛東西，大陸有很多爛東西，我們怎麼讓別人聽到。

1999 年到 2001 年是Indymedia高峯期， 2001 年到 2003 年是 Blog 興起，後期有一些商業平臺進來，但這些都還不算大問題。一直到 2004 年臉書進來， 2006 年推特進來，這些才是真的終結一切的東西。臉書之後沒有人願意再自己去辛苦搭建一個服務器，運營一個服務器。因為一方面還是有一點點技術門檻在，再者，那個時候即使你自己再去搭，你也達不到人家那麼大的體量了， Network effect 出來了。

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English

March 01, 2025

Crypto Flight Vol.7 | Interview with Huang Sunquan: Cryptos, Punks, Lacking of Original Thought; Friends, We Are Still Under Colonization.

Abstract: The Crypto Movement Dominated by Liberal Will: The Hypocrisy of Globalization and the Recolonization of the California Ideology.

"Crypto Flight" is a series of interviews by Uncommons, focusing on pioneers active in the Ethereum and crypto world. It documents the reality of the crypto space and produces diverse perspectives, using conversation and everyday language as methods to distill distant and far-off truths. Inspired by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's Vol de Nuit (Night Flight), it symbolizes the challenge and exploratory spirit of cypherpunks and crypto citizens as they venture to the ends of the world.

💡Opening Remarks/卷首語

In this series of interviews, we aim to trace the evolving ideological threads of the crypto wave. From the Cold War starting in the 1940s, the counterculture and Vietnam War of the 1960s, to the open-source movement, hacker culture, libertarianism of the 1970s and 1980s, and the California ideology represented by networks like The Whole Earth Catalog—these historical juncture points carried spiritual elements that, through generational transmission, laid the ideological groundwork for the later politicization of cryptography, the establishment of the Cypherpunk mailing list in the 1990s, and the exploration of cryptocurrencies. These influences from decades ago continue to guide the practice of the latest generation today. Standing in the present, we often hear faint echoes of this history but struggle to grasp its impact viscerally. Through this series, we hope to connect with early participants of this movement and listen to their reflections.

On the occasion of the 9th Conference of the Network Society in Thailand, we spoke with Professor Huang Sunquan, Director of the Institute of Network Society at the China Academy of Art, in Bangkok. The Institute of Network Society (hereafter "INS") has long focused on the impact of network communication technologies on sociocultural dynamics. Since 2016, the annual conference has explored the relationship between technological development and social transformation through diverse themes, observing how networks shape art, social thought, and global activism. The conference’s themes closely track technological shifts and social realities, with past participants including key figures like Vitalik Buterin and other crypto practitioners and researchers.

Many of the Institute’s recent work revolves around encryption technologies, such as facilitating rural development with blockchain to issue social tokens like "Coop." Beyond his primary roles as an artist and professor, Huang Sunquan is also a pioneer in the Chinese-speaking internet sphere, having advanced the localization of open-source software in Asia and established early independent online media and blogging communities. His engagement with the internet has always been tied to activism, which in turn shapes his own philosophy of technology: technology must be socially reformed.

With extensive experience in and reflections on the crypto world, Huang Sunquan often connects these insights to his firsthand involvement in early internet revolutions, cooperative movements, and social activism. Our interview unfolded from this foundation.

Review of Technological-Cultural History

The Relationship Between Libertarianism and Crypto Ideology

935：We know you recently completed a series of interviews in San Francisco for your Trilogy on Culture and Technology, delving into the social context of information technology in the last century. Our current series on the crypto wave follows a similar approach. We see how a chain of events—the Cold War, counterculture, hacker movements, libertarianism—subtly shaped the later ethos of cypherpunk.

Some influences are clear, while others are less so. For example, we know libertarianism deeply permeated crypto ideology, but what key factors drove to this permeation?

Huang Sunquan: The evolution of this social movement’s ideological lineage is a critical question, and I don’t have definitive answers. But situating this lineage within a broader Western perspective helps clarify it.

Simply put, Cypherpunks themselves lacked a coherent ideology; they had no genuine intellectual foundation, leaving them vulnerable to ideological capture by libertarianism.

This takeover traces back to the Cold War era, when the Cold War, libertarianism, and cryptography formed a symbiotic trio. The Soviet Union’s launch of satellites triggered great panic in the U.S. as they feared themselves being technologically behind. For the U.S., catching up technologically was seen as essential to preserving freedom. This notion of "freedom" becomes a shared subconscious between libertarians and the Department of Defense (the DoD): libertarians saw advanced technology as key to individual autonomy, while the DoD linked it to national ideological sovereignty. Later manifestos for the internet and cryptocurrencies echoed this—"protecting freedom," "defending American-style freedom"—all rooted in this deep-seated subconscious.

Beyond shared technological aspirations, libertarians’ pursuit of freedom at the time did not inherently conflict with U.S. state power. Countercultural communes idealized a specific form of individualistic freedom. For libertarians, having wealth and technology meant independence from the state—not necessarily opposing it, but maximizing individual liberty. Their ideology aligned with the DoD’s during that period.

Under the Cold War, cryptography and early information technology became tools jointly championed by libertarians and the government to bolster American and individual freedom. The DoD allocated 80% of its R&D funding to three "Cold War universities"—MIT, Berkeley, and Stanford—for foundational tech development. MIT’s PTP-1 laid the groundwork for subsequent computer advancements, with each new machine deployed in military branches like the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The book Creating the Cold War University documents this. Earlier examples like Bell Labs also supported government R&D, albeit with a more pragmatic focus akin to today’s Shenzhen*.

The earliest development of Shenzhen started from Shekou, the secretary of Shekou himself was very pragmatic, and it was he who first proposed that "time is money, efficiency is life". Later, the overall industry in Shenzhen also paid more attention to hardware manufacturing and real-time adjustment according to the market (such as the style of DJI, Huawei, Xiaomi).

Initially, libertarianism, cryptography, and the Cold War were co-conspirators. Among them, libertarianism became the dominant ideology. The DoD sought to preserve American freedom, punks wanted personal freedom, and libertarians demanded freedom of will (my property, my money, free from control). These three streams converged.

Cypherpunks, having absorbed libertarian ideology, were taken over by it. Thus, the entire Cypherpunk movement became libertarian. I wouldn’t call it liberal or neoliberal—it’s fundamentally libertarian. Today, Cypherpunks advocates privacy via cryptography as a primary goal, but this goal isn’t universal; it’s libertarian. Cryptography ensures privacy, but privacy matters little to the poor—it’s crucial for the wealthy and corporations. If you’re poor and own nothing, what privacy is there to protect? So while cryptography’s privacy claims seem universal, in practice, it often aids wealth transfer for the rich.

Technological capability without ideological direction, leading to capture by external ideologies, is a longstanding norm in tech. China is now powerful, but if asked, "What is your vision? What are you building?" the answers are vague. At best, you hear answers about financial freedom, but not spiritual freedom. What I hear most is a pragmatic, realistic view.

From my San Francisco interviews, a key thread emerged: libertarianism and technological progressivism are co-constructed. Behind this lies the Cold War, defense-funded universities, R&D labs, and technologies that interlink everything into data—then comes extraction.

China now has advanced tech and global commercial influence. But what ideology drives it? What culture are we promoting? Is China just another America? If our path mirrors the U.S., why oppose it? Do Chinese people have a unique approach to technology?

Philosophy of Technology: Integrating Social Movements and Technology

The Singular Metric of Productivity

935: Regarding how we should approach technology, I’ve recently had a new insight. Capitalist production models prioritize monetary value as the metric, aiming to maximize profit. To achieve this, production must be hyper-efficient—efficiency here typically means productive efficiency. The degree of "productive efficiency" serves as a value judgment for tools and technologies, measuring their "productivity." Human value, however, should be multifaceted (and ideally, so should technology’s value—though its primary role may indeed be productivity). Yet today, we’ve aligned human value with technological value, applying the same productivity metric to judge people, and reducing them to a single dimension. If human worth boils down to productivity—how much one contributes to GDP—and technology is similarly narrowed, then capitalism’s methods for coordinating resources and production are the most effective, as capitalism excels at maximizing this efficiency.

This value system seems to underpin our modern attitude toward technology—and subconsciously, toward people.

7k: Right, "productivity" itself is a singular-value term. Does it imply unifying diverse forms of production across regions into one metric, which is monetary value?

Huang Sunquan: Exactly. We evaluate productivity entirely through the market because there’s no other way to quantify it. Once the market evaluation dominates, this phenomenon is inevitable.

Self-Orientalization

Huang Sunquan: Evaluating technology is tricky, as many technological perspectives have their shortcomings to varying degrees. Beyond the productivity lens, I also reject explanations that attribute East-West technological gaps to philosophical differences—the idea that Chinese or Indian philosophies inherently shape distinct technological trajectories. But I think this explanation only holds to a certain extent. For example, historically, Ming Dynasty China emphasized Dao and Qi (the Way and artifacts), yet this didn’t hinder its global technological leadership. Studying the philosophy of technology can’t stop at cultural attitudes; this merely essentializes the fluid nature of historical struggles and realities, which doesn’t solve many issues.

Now that Western technological pathways seem exhausted, some try weaponizing specific elements of Chinese culture as a form of resistance. This won’t work—there has never been a successful precedent for this in history. The Ming Dynasty and Japan’s Meiji Restoration prove this. Did Japan abandon Bushido during Meiji? No. It thrived by embracing new ideas without erasing its culture, just as Ming China did. Therefore, while culture certainly shapes our attitude toward technology, it does not determine whether technology succeeds or not. Technological success is a universal issue; it's a mathematical problem.

Yuk Hui’s acclaimed writings, popular in the West, argue China is unique because we see technology as Qi (artifacts) guided by Dao (the Way). Romanticizing "Eastern technological cognition" like this is a repackaged cultural clash theory—a self-orientalizing philosophy. How could this be our answer? To understand how China’s technology has advanced, we need to look at how the contemporary state plays a role in steering technology, and how it views development and progress. That’s the key, not relying on the viewpoint of traditional culture. India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and mainland China all have diverse cultures—do they thus have distinct technologies?

935: Can we understand it this way? Initially, the theory of technological divergence was meant to offer another perspective on technology, helping everyone realize that, beyond the Western approach of modernizing technology, we might have other paths to choose from. Ideally, the best scenario would be for us to expand our understanding, so that after looking at multiple reference cases, there would be more possibilities in how we approach technology. But now, the way of emphasizing Eastern attitudes has specialized Eastern culture, leading a group of people to switch from one dominant way of thinking, which offered a single solution, to another dominant way of thinking that also presents itself as the one and only answer.

Huang Sunquan: Yes. If everyone retreats to the mountains to "cultivate enlightenment" to solve life’s anxieties, isn’t that self-Orientalization?

The Value of Technology to be Socially Applied

Huang Sunquan: My current view is that : If technology is a force, and social change can steer it toward "progress," then American libertarianism isn’t wholly repulsive because countercultural forces counterbalance it. These forces—protests, critiques—turn it into a pluralistic ideology. But when new technologies arrive in China, our society lacks such forces to resist, test, or redirect them. Without this cultural power, technology here becomes purely pragmatic and profit-driven. The U.S. has the same tech, but social movements—anti-war protests, student activism—shape its trajectory. We lack this.

In Taiwan, social forces mediate technology differently. My generation protested in front of the Presidential Office, demanding the president’s resignation. I joined labor movements and community reforms—we knew exactly what to do with technology. We eagerly adopted Indymedia and blogs because, previously, speaking out required mainstream media. Suddenly, we could post daily, and criticize freely. This transformed social change. The same technology became a grassroots tool.

That's a powerful example of social movements shaping public policies. In Taiwan, these waves of movements, like gender movements, have played a significant role in creating awareness and driving change. The example of female students at NTU fighting for gender equality through actions like the A-movie event or the "Occupy men's bathroom" campaign shows how grassroots activism can bring attention to unfair practices and challenge societal norms. The outcome, where female restroom space became larger than men's in public buildings, is a direct result of collective effort and the persistence of these movements. It also reflects how such movements, even if initially viewed as controversial or rebellious, can lead to tangible policy changes that address gender inequality.

It's indeed these continuous shifts that allowed Taiwan to become what it is today. So what I focus on is the power of social change, not the abstract traditional culture, which feels a bit distant from us. However, the power of social change must be grounded in cultural traditions, and social change certainly has its own cultural tone, but it’s not about things like Laozi, Zhuangzi, or Taoism.

What I focus on is that the intersection of technology, reality, and culture isn't too far apart. I just don't like the approach where everything has to start with Daoism or Mohism; I think that doesn't work. What matters most to me is social change. The social changes in each region are bound to be different—India has its own, Japan has its own, Taiwan has its own, and Mainland China has its own variations, especially considering the huge differences between the north and south. So I think what we need to focus on is the impact of these changes—that's what I care about the most.

Here’s another example of social forces improving technology. When Uber first entered Taiwan, thousands of taxi drivers drove their cars to the Presidential Office to protest Uber. Eventually, they forced Uber to align its prices with the local market rates, pay taxes, and ensure that all drivers went through professional training—these were all pressures from labor unions. Now, in Taiwan, you can take Uber or any other local taxi, and Uber drivers enjoy the same level of protection, so there's no fear of exploitation by big platforms. The existence of Green Taxi in Texas is also because of the labor unions fighting against Uber.

So, I believe that without the power of social change, technology will not improve. When technology has social forces to balance it, it becomes a "better" technology. These social forces are often very traditional—unions, communities, and local forces—offering protections like minimum wages and basic vocational training. Without these forces, technology will become colonial; it will enter a place and destroy everything.

The technological awakening without a cultural context

935: We mentioned that new technologies must negotiate with social forces to localize and serve society. Or, as you wrote: "The social values embedded in technology are then socially applied." Yet recent awakenings around data sovereignty and digital rights lack major cultural movements. Is this awakening genuine or illusory?

Huang Sunquan: It’s a libertarian awakening.

935: I agree. Web3’s advocacy (so far) doesn’t stem from grassroots awakening but a minority framing their needs as universal.

Huang Sunquan: Right. Their rhetoric doesn’t address your generation’s real struggles. Still, their efforts are useful—our social forces are stagnant.

Taiwan’s open-source movement, ETBlue, and Audrey Tang emerged post-activism. Korea’s OhMyNews is tied to Roh Moo-hyun’s rise and labor traditions. Post-2000, platforms like Facebook and Twitter erased this organic dynamic. Taiwan’s movements have waned, narrowed to two "enemies": mainland China (nominally) and the KMT. Similarly, mainland discourse fixates on the U.S., stifling internal change. In this context, Web3, blockchain, or digital nomads might spark new forces—if they avoid libertarian individualism. If it’s just about personal wealth, it’s meaningless.

Contemporary California Ideology

Reenacting Colonialism

935: I’ve noticed a few shifts in the crypto space in recent years that seem positive, but I’m unsure if they’re genuine. For instance, there’s growing emphasis on non-Western perspectives, drawing from Third World cultures and marginalized ideas—a shift in guiding philosophy. But I question the motives: Is this a genuine expansion of vision and mindset, or just California ideology expanding its colonial reach, like WTO-style globalization?

Huang Sunquan: Your question reflects a historical pattern. America’s "Southeast Asia" is Mexico; Europe’s is Spain’s Ibiza. Now, crypto replicates this: for U.S. and Chinese crypto/Web3 communities, it’s Chiang Mai. This isn’t new—it’s inevitable, like 21st-century digital nomads as neo-hippies. But unlike old hippies who can made theater and music, today’s geeky nomads contribute nothing culturally. They’re painfully dull. Back in the day, hippies were naive and Orientalist too, but at least they had passion. Now, with geeks in charge, it’s lifeless—especially in Chinese-speaking circles, where everyone just chants “牛逼牛逼很棒” (“amazing, awesome”) without deeper critique.

Hypocritic ‘Diversity’

This turn toward the Third World is hypocritical “diversity.” The other day, I went to hear Vitalik speak at the ETHsea panel, and when he talked about why Southeast Asia is important for Ethereum, I almost died laughing when I heard his answer. He said the first reason is that the number of users in Southeast Asia is growing—there are millions now. The second reason is that it increases our diversity. I nearly laughed. Many of the people who come here to organize events have very high salaries, and they come to this place to create some public spaces and do meaningless activities. They talk about diversity, about gender equality, but the lower-income class is completely invisible to them. They talk about diversity, meaning differences in skin color or gender identity, but when I sit with you, we’re in the same class, which is why we can sit here together. These people organizing the events likely have a better attitude toward LGBT, new immigrants, and refugees than they do toward the poor.

Politically, California ideology and libertarianism paved Trump’s victory. Libertarianism widened wealth gaps, yet their advocates focus on politically correct categories: race, gender, and politics. The working class, those without jobs, are never in their sights. As a result, the lower class grows increasingly frustrated, with no one speaking for them. In the last U.S. election, over 60% of Asian Americans, 70% of Latinos, and Black voters backed Trump. This is no longer a conflict between minority groups and white people; it’s a conflict between the lower and upper classes.

The demise of unrealistic Web2: The Rise of Indymedia

935: We know that you initially started with the protection of rural architecture, then moved into art and design, and eventually shifted towards the internet. Could you share how this transition unfolded?

Huang Sunquan: I studied architecture and initially ran my own firm. During Taiwan’s anti-bulldozer movement against city hall, I mobilized hundreds of designers and thousands of citizens to oppose government plans. That’s when I realized architecture served capital, not people. I shut my firm, vowing to do something meaningful. I wanted to use architecture or media to spotlight overlooked issues.

Back then, activists like us organized small theaters, music festivals, and feminist events—leading to Taiwan’s first women’s film festival and theater festival in 1994. Mainstream media ignored us, so we created Pots Weekly, a DIY newspaper that ran for 20 years. Many Taiwanese youth grew up reading it. When Cui Jian released a new album, even Tang Feng came to write anonymous music reviews for us.

My internet involvement began around 2000 with the arrival of blogging systems. Early open-source software couldn’t handle double-byte characters (used in Chinese), making Chinese text unsearchable. We fought to integrate DBCS (Double Byte Character Set) support, which eventually led to localized versions of WordPress and other tools.

Double Byte Caracter Set, Chinese and other language characters are double bits, that is, two bytes, English language characters are generally one byte.

Even earlier than this, my involvement with the internet was through Indymedia in 1999. At that time, Indymedia had 120 cities participating globally, and we set up a center in Taipei. After solving the search issue, we became the first Chinese-language group to run Indymedia. Around 2000, there was no censorship on Indymedia—you could write articles, and upload pictures, sounds, and videos. Indymedia’s central website in Seattle had an RSS* system, which aggregated content from all 120 participating cities worldwide. All the content was gathered on that central site, and it was extremely powerful. At the time, the influence of Indymedia could rival that of mainstream media. For example, Amazon’s global website ranking for news outlets placed Indymedia very close to Reuters, AFP, and CNN, major international news outlets. Its functionality was very similar to what we see in Web 2.0 today—you could read, write, and upload content. So, if we’re talking about the origins of Web 2.0, Facebook and Twitter weren’t the first—those functions were already available in the Indymedia era.

• RSS：信息聚合技術，Really Simple Syndication。

The Loss of Grassroots Media Power

935: Why did grassroots media like Indymedia once rival mainstream outlets, while today’s media is monopolized?

Huang Sunquan: This involves several stages of transformation. Initially, everyone was writing and sharing things on Indymedia. Since there was no censorship, anything could be published on the platform. Indymedia had a recommendation mechanism where editors would vote on what they thought were the best posts to feature on the homepage. These editors were part of a collective collaborative organization, and users could also push content to the front, though their voting power was slightly lower. Eventually, the homepage featured what the editors considered the best or most important news, but if you scrolled down, you might find some content, such as far-right fascist views—so there was a very democratic recommendation system in place at the time.

Over time, some influential writers with personal followings realized that instead of posting on the Indymedia platform, they could build their own blogs and write there. This led to the rise of personal blogs. In a sense, this shift began to erode the collective effort that originally existed on platforms like Indymedia. When everyone was on Indymedia, there was a sense of collective resistance, a unified voice. However when individuals moved to their own blogs, it became a one-on-one relationship between the writer and the audience. This felt different.

However, this change wasn’t fully corrupting yet. Most people still rely on major servers to host their personal blogs. There were leading servers in the three regions, such as Blog.cn in China. These large servers organized events, such as the first Chinese-language Blog competition. At the time, Fang Xingdong was always around doing this and that, and we didn’t pay much attention to him until later when he became known as the "Father of Blogs." Even the former director of MIT Media Lab participated in the community because, at that time, Asia needed to solve the shared problem of using double-byte languages in software. So, the blog community in Asia, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan, was largely interconnected. We had meetings in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, and to some extent, the years 2000-2003 might have been the most intimate moment for the three regions.

During the blog era, communication between individuals and organizations, and between organizations, still had some emotional ties. The real transformation came after 2003, when commercial systems started to enter. For example, the China Times had its own server, the United Daily News had its own server, and Taiwan’s Wretch had its own server. However since our server (twblog.net) was old and slow, people started moving to commercial platforms. At the same time, these commercial platforms had a much larger promotional reach, and they quickly became popular. Initially, blogs weren’t focused on profitability, but the concept of influencers started to emerge around this time. Some commercial platforms would pay influencers to write on their platform. Servers also needed money to maintain operations, so this was when the question of profitability started to appear.

7K: Is this the beginning of capitalism co-opting things? Because people started thinking about profit.

Huang Sunquan: Yes. Commercial platforms monetized through ads, which users couldn’t remove. Your blog was no longer yours.

7K: But didn’t commercialization bring scale and better services?

Why Did the Transition Spiral Out of Control?

935: I have a question. From the earliest Indymedia platform, which had Web2 functionality but also embodied a collective spirit, it gradually shifted to personal blogs, and finally commercial platforms took over. I understand this as a process of Web2 evolving from a non-commercial to a commercial version. During this transition, it seems that we gradually lost control over our own content and moved step by step towards the monopolized version of Web2 that people dislike today. Is the reason for this situation that we made the wrong commercial model choices along the way?

For example, I know that in the 1990s, when the commercial Internet of Things was still in its early stages, we had two proposed profit models for the Internet: one was Micropayments, and the other was the advertising model we are most familiar with today. Micropayment was about paying electronic currency for everything you accessed on the internet, which was essentially the precursor to today’s cryptocurrencies. Its advantage was that the platform and the government couldn’t link consumption records to personal information. However, the internet later chose the advertising model, where everything is "free," but it seems that with this model, we gradually lost control over both our content and our privacy.

Huang Sunquan: The final choice is related to our media habits. For example, we’re used to watching television without paying any money, and this makes most people accustomed to that type of consumption model. The internet started out in a similar way, much like watching TV or listening to the radio. If you had to pay right from the beginning, it likely would have resulted in no one using it. Additionally, at the beginning, people weren’t familiar with online payment tools, so there was a learning curve. However, now it’s difficult to go back and imagine what might have happened if we had chosen a different path back then.

935: If we think about this commercialization issue from a different perspective, could we say that the problem isn't about choosing which method to monetize, but rather the issue might lie in the very act of monetization itself?

Huang Sunquan: Perhaps so. The motivation behind the creation and doing things has changed. In the 90s, when open-source was just beginning, there was no thought about monetization; people were just thinking, "This world is bad enough, how can I make others hear my voice?" Money wasn't even a consideration. When blog platforms started emerging around 2002, it was still the same. Taiwan had many poor things, Hong Kong had many poor things, and Mainland China had many poor things—how could we make others hear about them?

From 1999 to 2001, Indymedia was at its peak, followed by the rise of blogs from 2001 to 2003. Commercial platforms started coming in, but those weren’t the main issue. It wasn't until Facebook came around in 2004 and Twitter in 2006 that things truly changed. After Facebook, no one wanted to go through the trouble of setting up a server and running it themselves anymore. On one hand, there was still some technical barrier, and on the other hand, even if you set up your own server, you couldn't match the scale of these platforms—the network effect had taken over.

✨ Tip

Limited by the length of the article, the interview with Mr. Huang Sunquan was divided into two parts. This article is the A-side, if you are interested in the next one, please subscribe.

www.ucpress.edu/books/creating-the-cold-war-university/hardcover

web.archive.org/web/20070113082706/http://pots.tw/

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indymedia

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